Competition economics -convergence
My first proposition, which might sound unlikely to an audience of competition law practitioners, is that competition economists are largely in agreement about the relevant economic principles. On this I am with Milton Friedman:
The public has the impression that economists never agree. They have the impression that if three economists are in a room they will get at least four opinions. That is false. If scientific issues are separated from policy and value issues, there is widespread agreement among economists whatever their political views. Over and over again I have been in a group that includes both economists and practitioners of other disciplines. Let a discussion start about almost anything and, in ten minutes or so, you will find all the economists on the same side against all the rest, whether the economists are on the left or the right or in the middle. 1980s there were rival schools of thought. Structuralist approaches to industrial economics, with their anti-concentration policy implications, that had held sway were subject to fierce attack from the 'Chicago School' and elsewhere. Robert Bork described antitrust as a policy at war with itself, and advocated per se lawfulness of a range of commercial conduct much of which had become close to per se illegal under prevailing standards. In US antitrust policy there followed the "Ascent of the Chicago School," as Kovacic and Shapiro (2000) call it, through the 1970s and 1980s. European competition law and policy, of course, has had nothing like a Chicago period: the Great Lakes are far even from the Atlantic.
While Chicago was ascending in US antitrust law and policy, competition economics internationally was undergoing a broad-based analytic transformation. The application of game theory and contract theory, though they might sound abstract, enabled rigorous analysis of everyday market features that standard price theory (the basis for much of Chicago) left out, such as interdependent decisions between small numbers of firms, dynamics and imperfect information. The so-called "new industrial economics" gathered pace in the 1980s and was masterfully synthesized in Jean Tirole's (1988) To a considerable extent, then, the economic principles and tools for competition analysis have converged. There is a broadly common way of thinking -a shared general framework in which to assess the facts and agree or disagree about what should happen in, say, a particular case.
Cartel and merger policy -convergence
To what extent can the same be said of competition law and policy? And how well do competition law and policy cohere with competition economics? The answers to these questions depend very much upon which areas of competition law and policy one is talking about. per se illegality is however the exception:
[T]his Court presumptively applies rule of reason analysis, under which antitrust plaintiffs must demonstrate that a particular contract or combination is in fact unreasonable and anticompetitive before it will be found unlawful. Per se liability is reserved for only those agreements that are "so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality."
Most economists would not go so far as to say that horizontal price-fixing agreements are bad in all possible circumstances, but would agree that beneficial ones are so rare that it makes sense to ban the lot, having regard to the costs of administration and adjudication. As Whinston (2006, page 18) We appreciate the potential reply that it is impossible to say that a given practice "never" could injure consumers. A creative economist could imagine unusual combinations of costs, elasticities, and barriers to entry that would cause injury in the rare situation. … But just as rules of per se illegality condemn practices that almost always injure consumers, so antitrust law applies rules of per se legality to practices that almost never injure consumers. While this was not exactly the approach taken to drafting the OFT guidelines, they are, I
hope, soundly economics-consistent.
The same is broadly true of the draft EC non-horizontal merger guidelines issued last month (DG Competition, 2007) . From the outset these draft guidelines clearly reflect the first of the ten principles set out by the merger sub-group of the Economic Advisory
Group for Competition Policy (2006): "The competitive impact of non-horizontal mergers is fundamentally different from that of horizontal mergers." The EAGCP note (page 3) goes on to make the nice observation that while there are "canonical models" of harm to competition from horizontal mergers (Cournot, Bertrand, repeated games), there are none such for vertical or conglomerate mergers. Indeed the nearest to a "canonical model" (Chicago School) is of absence of harm to competition in those contexts.
Contrary to Chicago, non-horizontal mergers can harm competition, though only if there is existing market power. The task for guidelines is to highlight how, so that coherent theories of harm can be measured against the facts of cases. This seems an exemplary post-Chicago approach.
Abuse of dominance -continuing divergence
The argument so far has been that for cartels and mergers there is substantial consistency of approach both geographically and as between competition law and economics. One cannot say the same for abuse of dominance, on which I will be brief on Arguably there should be trans-Atlantic difference in policies towards abuse of dominance. The European economy historically has been more monopolized than that of the US, and its competitive self-righting mechanisms may be less robust. Private actions are prevalent in the US (and with the possibility of treble damages) but not (yet) in
Europe. So perhaps for single-firm conduct, as distinct from cartels and possibly mergers, the balance of risks between chilling pro-competitive conduct and failing to curb anti-competitive conduct is markedly different across the Atlantic, to an extent that warrants a different stance of law and policy. Moreover, there is substantial intra-jurisdictional uncertainty, if not variation, as controversial cases like LePages illustrate in the US.
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These points have some merit but I very much doubt they can explain or justify the degree of difference now apparent between the approaches to Article 82 and to section 2 of the Sherman Act. An immediate difference is that in some circumstances pure exploitation of market power can breach European competition law, unlike US In Wanadoo dominance and abuse were found despite the new and fast-growing nature of the market for high-speed Internet access. The judgment underlines that prices below variable cost are to be assumed eliminatory -abusive in themselves. Prices above variable cost but below total cost must be regarded as abusive if part of a plan to eliminate rivals -as shown by documents revealing a strategy of market "pre-emption."
To find predatory abuse there is no need to show that recoupment of losses is likely.
Weyerhaeuser concerned allegations of predatory bidding in an input market (for logs), not predatory pricing on the selling side. The Court of Appeals had not applied the Supreme Court's Brooke Group tests for predatory pricing -i.e. showing price below an appropriate measure of cost, and demonstrating a dangerous probability of recouping the investment in below-cost pricing. Arguably, law and policy should be more cautious in condemning low selling prices than high bids for inputs, on the view that low selling prices are pro-consumer and normally the essence of competition. But the Supreme Court adopted the symmetrical position, underlined the Brooke Group tests and made clear that 6 Another example is the apparent split between circuits of the US Court of Appeals over whether monopoly leveraging can by itself be a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. Judge Easterbrook in Schor v Abbott, quoted above, said not, on the Chicago School view that 'a monopolist can take its monopoly profit just once'. 7 However the Court of Appeal in Attheraces v BHB showed a degree of aversion to price regulation via competition law, and held that cost-based assessment of excessive pricing allegations is too narrow.
they apply equally to the input side of markets. Only higher bidding that results in belowcost pricing in the output market can be the basis for a finding of predation, and a dangerous probability of recoupment must also be proved.
Neither judgment is surprising, and I am not seeking to criticize either of them.
The point is to note the continuing trans-Atlantic contrast, and in an area -predatory pricing -where Article 82 law is relatively well-developed and economics-coherent.
There were features of each case -the nascent market in the EC case and the input market in the US case -that might have allowed at least some modification of tone, but Commission. There have been promising but so far inconclusive signs that the Commission will seize it by adopting a more economics-and effect-based policy approach, but that is a topic for another day.
Vertical agreements -prospective divergence?
The area of US antitrust law to have seen the most rapid change in interpretation has been non-price vertical agreements. From the late 1960s to the early 1980s, very much influenced by Chicago School economics, the Courts and enforcement agencies moved from per se illegality to rule of reason for a wide range of vertical restraints.
Though EC law is perhaps less tolerant of non-price vertical agreements than US law, the 1999 reforms to the block exemption regulation for vertical agreements reflect a consistent economic approach, which in particular recognizes that (non-price) vertical agreements are generally benign in competitive conditions. The economists' brief denies that minimum RPM almost always produces anticompetitive effects. To the contrary, RPM can help align the incentives of manufacturers and retailers pro-competitively to the benefit of consumers -by promoting service provision at retail level (the "free-rider" argument), by ensuring retailer contribution to product quality, and by supporting inventory investment in the face of demand uncertainty. The free-rider argument, in short, is that there are circumstances where consumers care not only about price but also about retail services that enhance product quality, for which it is impractical to charge separately and which carry no obligation to purchase. Without vertical restraints, retailers providing those services would be undercut by "free-riding" retailers that do not, and incentives to provide the services would be lacking. Vertical restraints, including RPM on occasion, can maintain incentives for such service provision. Inter-brand competition, if healthy, ensures that market incentives are to offer the price/quality offerings that consumers want. especially compared to less restrictive alternative means of aligning retailer incentives.
Decision theory implies that it is not just the relative frequency of pro-and anticompetitive consequences that matters to the assessment of a per se rule, but the severity of resulting harm in either case. Vertical agreements on price, says the brief, are sufficiently more harmful overall than non-price agreements to warrant different treatment under the law. Rule of reason cases are lengthy, costly and hard for plaintiffs to win. Other jurisdictions, including the EU, generally ban RPM. Finally, the brief argues that if the Court does overrule Dr. Miles, it should adopt a presumption of illegality rebuttable by demonstration that RPM was reasonably necessary to achieve a legitimate business purpose of benefit to consumers, which, if shown, would shift the burden of proof of anti-competitiveness back to the plaintiff. shall not apply to vertical agreements which, directly or indirectly, in isolation or in combination with other factors under the control of the parties, have as their object: (a) the restriction of the buyer's ability to determine its sale price, without prejudice to the possibility of the supplier's imposing a maximum sale price or recommending a sale price, provided that they do not amount to a fixed or minimum sale price as a result of pressure from, or incentives offered by, any of the parties; … This does not quite amount to per se illegality, because in theory exemption under Article 81(3) is still possible. 14 However, as the Commission guidelines make clear, individual exemption of agreements containing such "hardcore" restrictions is unlikely.
US law is not EC law and even
Likewise and furthermore, the Commission's 2001 de minimis notice on agreements of 14 On point is the 1995 judgment of the European Court of Justice in the Publishers Association case, which overturned a Commission decision (upheld by the Court of First Instance) not to grant an exemption to the UK Net Book Agreement. The ECJ found that the Commission had not adequately considered the reasons why the national court had previously judged the NBA beneficial.
minor importance expressly excludes RPM, as a "hardcore" restriction, from the kinds of agreement between non-competitors that the Commission considers not to have an appreciably restrictive effect on competition.
There is a natural attraction to this approach, notwithstanding economic logic, price vertical agreements is not so large in terms of economic effect as to justify radically different treatment under the law. 16 I recognize that policy considerations might trump these points, and that they are in reality unlikely to receive European attention unless Dr.
Miles is reversed in the US. But if it is, the time might be ripe for a serious European debate about competition policy towards RPM.
A continuum from per se illegality to full rule-of reason?
I mentioned earlier that the amicus brief from the American Antitrust Institute in Picture this. Luciano Pavarotti, Placido Domingo, and Jose Carreras are in a recording studio preparing to record yet another "Three Tenors" album. The orchestra is tuning up, the singers are going over the music, when suddenly in burst the Antitrust Police. The three are carted away in handcuffs for conspiring to combine their unique talents in restraint of trade. "Had they not combined in this manner," intoned the commissioner, "there could have been three recordings, not one". the Supreme Court has steadily moved away from the dichotomous approach − under which every restraint of trade is either unlawful per se, and hence not susceptible to a procompetitive justification, or subject to full-blown rule-of-reason analysis − toward one in which the extent of the inquiry is tailored to the suspect conduct in each particular case.
The move has not been to a trichotomy, with an intermediate "quick look"
category, but "away from any reliance on fixed categories towards a continuum." It will be most interesting to see where in such a framework the Supreme Court places RPM in the Leegin case.
Another recent Supreme Court case of some interest in this context is Illinois Tool
Works. The case concerned the tying of ink to printers, where the tying product was patented. Years ago, tying was widely per se illegal in the US, but, as the judgment explains:
Over the years, however, this Court's strong disapproval of tying arrangements has substantially diminished. Rather than relying on assumptions, in its more recent opinions the Court has required a showing of market power in the tying product.
Thus in the 1984 case Jefferson Parish, concerning hospital services, the Court explained that condemnation of tying arrangements depended on market power, but added that market power could be presumed if the tying product were patented. In Illinois Tool Works, however, the Court concluded that the mere fact that a tying product is patented does not support any presumption of market power. As to the influence of economics, the Court noted that:
It is no doubt the virtual consensus among economists that has persuaded the enforcement agencies to reject the position that the Government took when it supported the per se rule that the Court adopted in the 1940's.
Thus there has been a shift from condemnation of tying tout court to conditional condemnation ("qualified per se"), with the conditions evolving over time. The Limitations on parallel trade may be thought to be "hardcore," yet the judgment at paragraph 119, referring to prior case law, eschews formalism, saying:
the application of Article 81(1) EC to the present case cannot depend solely on the fact that the agreement in question is intended to limit parallel trade in medicines or to partition the common market, which leads to the conclusion that it affects trade between Member States, but also requires an analysis designed to determine whether it has as its object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition on the relevant market, to the detriment of the final consumer. … [T]hat analysis, which may be abridged when the clauses of the agreement reveal in themselves the existence of an alteration of competition … must, on the other hand, be supplemented, depending on the requirements of the case, where that is not so.
So such restrictions are not per se illegal, but abridged analysis may in some circumstances suffice. After analysis, the Court concluded that the Commission had been entitled to find that the agreements had anti-competitive effect within the meaning of Article 81(1), or as put in paragraph 190: "the effect of reducing the welfare of final consumers." However, after further analysis the Court found that the Commission had too readily rejected GSK's arguments for exemption under Article 81(3).
More generally, this CFI judgment is notable for its rejection of formalistic argument 18 and its many references, illustrated above, to consumer welfare. May this portend greater convergence between economics and competition law in Europe?
